The great conundrum at the heart of the 1946 whaling regime 1 story has always been how an international agreement originally framed to save the whaling industry became the international instrument of choice for saving the whales, or at least for framing what is turning out to be an almost indefinite moratorium on the taking of most whales. It is, on the surface, an extraordinary volte-face, so extraordinary that the behavior of the states involved is deeply puzzling and the longevity of the regime -going on seventy years now -hard to understand.
problems. The whaling regime rests on "faulty premises" 4 and has sustained itself for as long as it has only through a tacit understanding among all concerned that "law should be side-stepped." 5 The situation would be entirely absurd were it not for the fact that the regime has a certain morbid efficiency; no-one is quite ready to jettison the existing whaling regime in favor of something radically different or no regime at all. 6 The clear implication, however, is that if the life of the whaling regime cannot be made more meaningful it ought to be allowed to die. And serious students of effective international wildlife law and policy should direct their attention somewhere else.
NEW LIFE FOR AN OLD WATCHDOG: THE WHALING REGIME
In fact, neither the eighty-nine sovereign states parties to the whaling convention 7 nor the intensely interested band of activists and scholars 8 who follow the ins and outs of the International Whaling Commission's always tempestuous meetings 9 can tear themselves away from the still unfolding story. Far from lapsing into a well-deserved obscurity as a freak and inconsequential regime that no self-respecting observer of international wildlife law would waste time analyzing, the whaling regime has in recent years become more fascinating than ever.
Most notably and most recently the International Court of Justice published its decision in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand intervening).
10 And this was preceded by the publication of no less than three books, all of which find, albeit for somewhat 4 Id. at 308. The faulty premises of the regime are also explored in a second, well-remembered essay at the end of the volume: Christopher D. Stone, Summing Up: Whaling and Its Critics, in id. at 269-291. 5 Victor (2001), supra note 2, at 308. 6 Victor argues in somewhat fanciful language that the regime may be "Pareto optimal." Id. at 293-294. The blunter and more widespread assessment is that "the IWC is broken and needs to be fixed" [GEOFFREY PALMER, REFORM: A MEMOIR (2013), at 661], although views differ greatly about whether and how this might be done. 7 For a list, see http://www.iwc.int/members (accessed 30 December 2014). 8 The parameters of the various constituencies with a sustained interest in the work of the IWC are still usefully captured in PETER J. STOETT, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF WHALING 61-102 (1997). 9 "The IWC has two major meeting forums, the Commission Meeting and the Scientific Committee Meeting. The Scientific Committee Meeting is attended by up to 200 scientists, and the Commission Meeting is attended by around 400 people including government delegates, observers from non-member governments, other intergovernmental organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and representatives of the media. In 2012, the Commission agreed to move from annual to biennial Commission Meetings. The Scientific Committee continues to meet annually." See http://iwc.int/meetingsmain (accessed 30 December 2014). 10 The judgment of the Court in Whaling in the Antarctic ( 328-340 (2014) . At the end of May 2014, the Centre for International Law at Kobe University in Japan held a symposium on the Court's judgment, and has since tracked both published and unpublished commentary on the judgment, including blog posts. See http://www.edu.kobeu.ac.jp/ilaw/en/whaling_ICJ_decision_comments.html (accessed 30 December 2014). The Kobe website also archives papers given at the symposium, among them an account of the legal background to and history of the litigation by a principal Australian strategist, Donald R. Rothwell, The Whaling Case: Australian Perspectives, http://www.edu.kobe-u.ac.jp/ilaw/en/whaling_docs/paper_Rothwell.pdf (accessed 30 December 2014). different reasons in each case, that the history of the whaling regime illuminates vital aspects not only of the origins of international wildlife law but also of its future.
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Any number of explanatory factors has been suggested and continues to be debated to explain the history of the whaling regime, ranging from political capture 12 to legal evolution 13 to bureaucratic entrepreneurship 14 within the regime's key institution, the International Whaling Commission (IWC). But no matter how ingeniously scholars have woven together these various explanatory factors they have always come to the conclusion that as a matter of international law the whaling regime is highly unsatisfactory. 15 And, furthermore, it will never amount to much unless it makes its mind up what it wants to be or, more precisely, until the contracting parties decide what they want it to be. 16 On the one hand, it can be the agent of a complete and total cessation of the taking of whales. 17 On the other hand, it can be an instrument for resuming whaling and rehabilitating the whaling industry, albeit it on a demonstrably sustainable basis and on a very TREATIES (2014) . The view that the ICRW has evolved, and that it would be a good thing if it further evolved, in conjunction with other international wildlife and biodiversity conservation treaties, is treated in both GILLESPIE (2005), supra note 11, and COUZENS (2014), supra note 11. 14 The essence of the history of the IWC, according to BURNETT (2012) , supra note 11, is that it demonstrates the impacts entrepreneurial scientists can have on the welfare of wildlife populations when they act as "savvy political animals" (p.6) within the bureaucratic interstices of an institution such as the IWC. 15 16 The whole point of TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME (Robert L. Friedheim ed. 2001) was that the IWC could and should return to its 1946 roots and map out a program to revive the whaling industry on a sustainable basis. COUZENS (2014), supra note 11, at 224-227, takes the view that the polarization between the whaling and anti-whaling blocs is now so extreme that the only viable way forward is to move to higher ground in international law, and to ask whether the ICRW and other wildlife treaties, and the states party to them, can be brought together under the umbrella vision of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) [31 I.L.M. 818 (1982) ]. This assumes, of course, that there is a compelling vision underlying the CBD and that a large number of diverse states in and out of the IWC find it attractive. The United States is not a CBD signatory. 17 Victor (2001) , supra note 2, at 307, says the more time goes by the more apparent it becomes that the "whaling problem" is being solved by changing public perceptions and tastes about whales, not through the imposition of international legal rules. The logical outcome of this trajectory would be a complete cessation of whaling, eventually. It is unlikely, however, that opponents of whaling will wait for nature to take its course. Options for acting against Japan, if it does resume Antarctic whaling, are already being mapped. See Tim Stephens, After the Storm: The Whaling in the Antarctic Case and the Australian Whale Sanctuary, Legal Studies Research Paper 14/102 (Law School, University of Sydney, Australia, November 2014), available to SSRN subscribers at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2528330. than ever before. 18 But it cannot, in the eyes of its critics, keep straddling the available options without creating for itself a permanent crisis of legitimacy and substantial risk of ridicule.
The dynamics of the whaling regime have repeatedly shown, however, a deep reluctance on the part of the contracting states to move decisively in one of these directions rather than the other. This indecision might be warranted on several grounds. In terms of the science involved, for example, there is a lot more to be known, even today, about whales and whaling than we know already, and until we know more decisiveness is arguably premature.
19 One can also take the view that indecision is the price of defending the most sacred principle of international law, namely the principle of sovereignty. Indecision keeps disgruntled contracting states from simply walking away from the ICRW, and then taking whales, which it is their sovereign right to do and which Norway and Iceland have already done. 20 And it may also be that the continuing impasse on the regulation of whaling at the IWC simply reflects the fact that the peoples of the world have not yet finally made up their minds what they want to think about whales and, therefore, what they want to do with them.
Perhaps it would be possible to cut through these Gordian knots by consulting the whales themselves and asking them what future they prefer. For most observers, however and perhaps regrettably, that option seems fanciful. 21 And so, short of an intervention deus ex machina to tip the balance one way or the other, or of giving up altogether, the interested parties continue to muddle through along a path to which some few of them committed themselves in 1946 and which they, now along with many others, are apparently not yet ready to abandon.
In the meantime, of course, a regime that has become deeply unsatisfactory as a poster child of all that international law can accomplish for wildlife has positively affected whales.
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18 Palmer (2014), supra note 10, takes the view that the ICJ judgment in Whaling in the Antarctic amounts to a "comprehensive forensic defeat" for Japan (p. 125). Japan has clearly signaled, however, that it intends to resume whaling in the Southern oceans and has already submitted a new "scientific" program for it to the IWC. See http://iwc.int/private/downloads/7bqy9b9maskkk0gc0scccoo40/NEWREP_A.pdf. This NEWREP-A program at a minimum reflects the political determination of the recently re-elected conservative government in Japan to sustain a cultural affinity with whaling on the high seas. Japan will not be allowed to proceed, however, with a new "scientific whaling" exception to the moratorium on commercial whaling without first having the Scientific Committee of the IWC evaluate the scientific merits of the NEWREP-A proposal and issue its opinion. Thus, on top of the embarrassment and loss of face Japan has already suffered by having its most recent and much vaunted JARPA II "scientific whaling" program declared invalid by the ICJ, Japan will face new pressure to leave the IWC, if it still wants to take large numbers of whales for scientific purposes. Why hasn't Japan left already? A recent restatement of the view, often rehearsed in the literature, that Japan's real interest is in fish, not whales, appears 20 The comings and goings of states party to the ICRW are carefully traced and indexed by DORSEY, supra note 11. Iceland withdrew and then rejoined but filed an objection to the moratorium. 21 That it ought not to be fanciful is a thought brilliantly teased from a recent symposium on ferae naturae and the For the most part, their situation now, while far from perfect, is vastly improved, compared to what it was as recently as 1970. Some species affected by the depredations of the whaling industry are recovering more slowly than others. Some still face other acute threats in particular parts of the world. And all remain vulnerable to chronic changes in the marine environment, notably from marine pollution and climate change.
But overall, despite all the criticism levelled at it, the whaling regime stacks up pretty favorably in comparison to other international wildlife regimes in its ability to produce positive impacts for the species it seeks to affect. In the beginning the ICRW was not a wildlife treaty, but it has become one.
The fact that the whaling regime, warts and all, has worked and continues to work for whales raises some interesting and difficult questions about the way we think about treaty law and its relationship to wildlife conservation outcomes. They are questions that will be with us for some time to come.
What, for example, is the relationship between the wildlife conservation outcomes a treaty regime accomplishes and the legal form and function of the treaty itself? Is it a necessary and sufficient condition of producing favorable outcomes for wildlife that a treaty, when agreed to, have clear and specific conservation objectives, which do not change over time? Or can treaties and the regimes they bring into existence go through a process of evolution, as has arguably occurred in the case of the whaling regime, so that outcomes once thought unachievable or uninteresting become not only possible but of prime concern?
Is every treaty sui generis? Or can treaties be grouped into families based not only on what is in the language and structure of the treaty instrument but also on historical origins, operating procedures, and the motives of the people and organizations that advocated treaty drafting, negotiation and adoption? How do we know which treaties are, if you will, apples and which are oranges, so that the comparative analysis of treaties avoids mistaking apples for oranges?
And what happens to treaties when they die, or more precisely when the assumptions on which they rest become obsolete? If the whaling regime, for example, is premised on the desirability and feasibility of sustaining for the long-term a commercial whaling business that, except for a few, small, and nationally subsidized or culturally relict non-commercial operations has all but ceased to exist, is it time to recast the frame within which the conservation of whales is seen as a challenging and worthwhile international problem? Do wildlife treaties ever die? Or do they just fade away eventually, MacArthur-like, 23 as new ways of framing international conservation challenges and ways to meet them yield new agreements, which accrete atop the old ones to form a sort of sedimentary geology of regimes?
The importance and value of raising questions such as these 24 is underlined not only by recent developments affecting the whaling regime but also by the appearance of what is arguably 23 In his farewell address to Congress in April 1951, General Douglas MacArthur recalled the words of a barrack ballad popular when he joined the Army fifty-two years earlier to the effect that old soldiers never die, they just fade away. 24 The comparative analysis of treaty regimes on a much more anodyne basis, avoiding any difficult (but interesting) questions about history, politics, and international ambitions appears in the draft options paper produced by experts convened to inform a UNEP project on the "synergies" between the six major biodiversity-related conventions, and released for public review and comment on 15 December 2014, at http://www.cbd.int/doc/notifications/2014/ntf-2014-138-attachment-02-en.docx (accessed 30 December 2014).
the most direct and damning indictment of international wildlife law to surface since Simon Lyster first began to give distinct identity to the subject in 1985. 
CASTING OFF THE SHACKLES OF THE PAST: THE "ELEPHANT TREATIES"
Comes now Rachelle Adam 26 to argue that the biodiversity conservation treaties currently and widely regarded as the crown jewels of international wildlife law are seriously deficient. Far from making things better for wildlife, they are making things decidedly worse, most especially in the case of the charismatic elephant, where the inability of international treaties to save the species is both chronic and notorious. 27 Indeed, despite the elephant treaties, which is how Adam refers collectively to this accreted body of international law, precisely because of the charismatic significance of elephants for the international nature conservation movement and the place the elephant occupies in the history of that movement, scientists foresee the imminent demise of elephants, 28 unless there is a radical re-framing of the impending extinction problem as a matter of both international law 29 and national policy and practice. 30 The elephant treaties are irremediably poisoned by their colonial legacy. Adam describes and analyzes this in great detail. It is a legacy which makes the elephant treaties, in her view, unfit for purpose.
In Adam's book there is no reference whatsoever to the whaling regime. The defensible explanation for this is that her analysis focuses on the link between colonialism and biodiversity agreements, because that link is, in her view, the source of many of the drawbacks of those agreements. As Adam sees it, the whaling regime comes from a "totally different background" and for that reason cannot be considered a biodiversity agreement, even though it has done so much for the whales. 31 The whaling convention and the elephant treaties are apples and oranges. This stands in marked contrast to the approach taken to comparative treaty analysis by Ed Couzens, for whom the parallels between the old watchdog whaling treaty and what is for him another old watchdog, CITES, 32 one of the crown jewels of late twentieth century biodiversity conservation, are both strong and compelling. That is why they are at the core of his analysis. They are both, he says, "representative of a problematic tradition of managing particular wild species on their own, as if [they] were somehow isolated from their ecosystems, and [both] suffer from the problem that their states parties currently lack the common vision necessary for the treaties to succeed." 33 In his view, they are both apples.
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So, the way forward for all wildlife and especially the elephants of Africa, according to Adam, is to cast off the shackles of the past, which would mean inter alia abandoning the "obsolete" Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 35 and then replacing that and all the other elephant treaties with more narrowly framed agreements. The most effective scale at which to conserve wildlife in the international system as it currently exists, according to Adam, is that of the sovereign state and more particularly its subnational communities, 36 but the elephant treaties are not anchored in workable assumptions about how states work. Indeed, the treaties presuppose that the sovereign states of Africa do not and will not work, not to conserve wildlife at least, 37 and need to be circumvented through international arrangements of some sort, but not the CBD. (2014), supra note 11, at 1-2. 34 The argument for this is set out in id. at 1-10. 35 ADAM (2014), supra note 26, at 11. 36 The "dilemma of scales," choosing the scale at which biodiversity conservation can most effectively be pursued, is discussed in id. at 2-4. The great complicating factor, here, is the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), now enshrined as an international principle of customary law. Id. at 94-97. COUZENS, supra note 11, at 176-186, devotes a chapter to sovereignty over natural resources but differs from Adam in thinking that it is, can be, and should be a more malleable principle than Adam allows. Working around the limitations of sovereignty by putting major emphasis on community-based natural resource management, while it seems to be attractive For Couzens, on the other hand, the essential problem of international wildlife conservation is that we have little to work with except old watchdog treaties, like the ICRW and CITES, and they won't get the job done because they are burdened with outdated and unworkable assumptions about how nature works. For Couzens, the CBD offers much better possibilities inasmuch as he thinks it would "move us closer to the goal of overall protection" [of habitats and ecosystems rather than of particular species].
38 Indeed, it may offer the only possibilities because, as Adam adroitly notes, 39 the days when the international community evinced an interest in global biodiversity agreements with nearly as many signatories as there are members of the United Nations are gone.
The great value, then, of treating the international community's experience with whales and elephants as comparable, as apples if you will, is that it shows how all states have legitimate interests in wildlife conservation "in an increasingly globalized world," above and beyond the "obvious interests" stemming from the presence of wildlife within their own boundaries. The difference in views here of the life and death of wildlife treaties seems to me to be quite remarkable.
EVOLUTION ONLY BY CONSENSUS AND UNANIMITY?
The difference appears to hinge on a question of evolution (which is perhaps not inappropriate in relation to the life and death of treaties that aim to conserve wildlife and nature). Can there be departures from the original terms of an international agreement and if so under what circumstances? Must the subsequent practice that effectively amends the initial treaty have, for example, the unanimous or near unanimous support of contracting parties? Or is it the case that, once states decide how they want, in Nollkaemper's word, to "frame" a conservation problem, and they negotiate an agreement, and they then translate that agreement into treaty law, "the law freezes the frame and limits [its] relevance to other frames," 42 and its value, therefore, in solving complex conservation problems?
In the one case, the conceptualization of treaties and their history is essentially organic. Treaties are treated as if they were creatures, who are born, mature, become elderly and outdated, and eventually fade away or die, as if they were passing through some natural life cycle. In the other case, the progression appears to be mechanistic, with one frame succeeding another much as images pass through a projector and appear on a screen or in a PowerPoint presentation, as someone or something presses a button or clicks a mouse.
As nearly as I can tell, Nollkaemper has not (yet) explained the precise dynamics by which one frame is succeeded by another, although it presumably has a great deal to do with the 38 COUZENS (2014), supra note 11, at 227. 39 ADAM (2014), supra note 26, at 126-128. 40 COUZENS (2014), supra note 11, at 227. 41 Id. Couzens does not explain, however, how the CBD is to be made effective given the major damage done to it by the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. way in which scientific evidence about the changing (and usually deteriorating) status of species and ecosystems is created and then relayed to policy makers and the general public, and is then further exploited politically by networks of influential actors and interest groups to mobilize support for a change of frame within some relevant decision structure. In the organic case, at least as it is described by Adam, Dorsey and Couzens, the agency of change is much easier to discern.
In Adam's account, for example, the responsibility for bringing the elephant treaties into existence, and starting them on their life cycles, is placed very squarely on the shoulders of IUCN (the World Conservation Union), 43 which clearly had a long-term program to save nature from the vagaries of newly independent and capacity poor African states by trying to bring globally charismatic wildlife resources, and national parks, under effective international jurisdiction. 44 It was successful, at least in the sense that new treaties were proposed and endorsed. This is not entirely new information, because some of the ground was previously explored by Boardman, Caldwell, Holdgate, and Cioc, 45 albeit without any semblance of the sharp even harsh critical edge Adam brings to her treatment of IUCN or her riveting focus on colonialism.
But, while there may be some analytical purchase in talking about treaties metaphorically as if they had life and could evolve, the processes at work to shape that evolution are quite unclear, no matter whether we turn to Adam or Couzens or Nollkaemper, as is the question of whether these processes have anything to do with some mechanism of natural selection in the international system.
What is clear, however, and here we can revert to the ICJ judgment in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand intervening), is that talk about treaties as "living instruments" for the effective protection of wildlife, or for any other purpose, goes to the heart of some very basic and controversial issues in international law, issues that Bjorge has cleverly brought to the fore. 46 The essence of the problem is nicely stated by Arato:
On the one hand, in light of the important role of [international] organizations in supranational governance, there is a perceived need for them to employ a flexible approach to their functions in a changing legal and political environment. On the other hand, in light of the very same importance and sensitivity of the areas regulated by these treaties, there is a countervailing pressure to stick to the bargain struck. The evolution and adaptation of treaty-based organizations may be desirable under the right conditions. Their amendment procedures are often difficult to engage, making it difficult for these organizations to respond appropriately to manifest changes in international law and politics. Informal change may indeed yield desirable results-any particular such development will have to be judged in its own right, case-by-case. But the specter of consent always lurks in the background: irrespective of its outcome, informal transformation carries in its wake the potential to produce serious problems of legitimacy and accountability. 47 In the recent whaling case, Australia and New Zealand tried to persuade the ICJ that over the course of time the use of lethal means in scientific research on whales had been outlawed by resolutions of the IWC, notably but not exclusively one adopted in 1995 to the effect that the killing of whales only occur in exceptional circumstances and to answer scientific research questions that could not be answered by using existing data and/or the use of non-lethal research techniques. 48 The claim was that the resolutions were a valid basis for interpreting the original bargain struck in the ICRW, most especially in Article VIII(1), allowing contracting states to issue special permits to kill whales for purposes of scientific research. 49 The resolutions, thus, represented an agreement among the parties about how the treaty should be interpreted and what practices contracting states could lawfully follow.
The Court acknowledged that the ICRW had been amended several times by the IWC and that "the functions conferred on the Commission have made the Convention an evolving instrument." 50 It noted that resolutions could be relevant for the interpretation of the Convention when they were adopted by consensus or by unanimous vote. 51 But the resolutions relied on by Australia and New Zealand were not all of this kind. Some were adopted by majority vote and notably did not have the concurrence of Japan.
Australia and New Zealand overstate the legal significance of the recommendatory resolutions and Guidelines on which they rely. First, many IWC resolutions were adopted without the support of all States parties to the Convention and, in particular, without the concurrence of Japan. Thus, such instruments cannot be regarded as subsequent agreement to an amendment of Article VIII, nor as subsequent practice establishing an agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty within the meaning of [the relevant portions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties].
adopted by a disputed majority will not count under the general rules of interpretation" 53 articulated in the Vienna Convention.
What most impresses Arato about the judgment in the whaling case is the "jarring" contrast it presents to other ICJ judgments in other contexts in which, for example, reliance was placed on majority resolutions of the General Assembly as a proxy for subsequent practice of the members of the United Nations, and as an authentic basis on which to interpret the U.N. Charter.
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What most impresses me about the whaling case judgment is the heavy burden it places on students of wildlife treaties to deal more carefully and explicitly and at greater length with the evolution of such treaties, and with the bases on which they can be compared. And then to explain how such treaties can hold much hope for the conservation of wildlife, in Africa and around the world, if a chief mechanism for adapting such "living instruments" to changing conditions and circumstances is a rule of unanimous consent. That is not a rule, I think, that Charles Darwin would recognize or see as a very efficacious force in shaping the past, present, and future of the world's biodiversity. Nor does it bode well for the future of whales.
The editors invite additional perspectives on these issues. . 54 Id.
